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Abstract—A Delay-Tolerant Network (DTN) Architecture 
(Request for Comment, RFC-4838) and Bundle Protocol 
Specification, RFC-5050, have been proposed for space and 
terrestrial networks.  Additional security specifications have 
been provided via the Bundle Security Specification 
(currently a work in progress as an Internet Research Task 
Force internet-draft) and, for link-layer protocols applicable 
to Space networks, the Licklider Transport Protocol 
Security Extensions.  This document provides a security 
analysis of the current DTN RFCs and proposed security 
related internet drafts with a focus on space-based 
communication networks, which is a rather restricted subset 
of DTN networks.  Note, the original focus and motivation 
of DTN work was for the ‘Interplanetary Internet’.  This 
document does not address general store-and-forward 
network overlays, just the current work being done by the 
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) and the Consultative 
Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) Space 
Internetworking Services Area (SIS) - DTN working group 
under the ‘DTN’ and ‘Bundle’ umbrellas.  However, much 
of the analysis is relevant to general store-and-forward 
overlays. 12 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Delay-Tolerant Network Architecture, as described in 
RFC-4838 [1], is a generalized store-and-forward network 
overlay.  Its origins are from NASA JPL’s experiences with 
high delay, store-and-forward networks for deep space, and 
their experience gained in the development of the CCSDS 
File Delivery Protocol (CFDP) [2, 3].   
 
1 978-1-4244-3888-4/10/$25.00 ©2010 IEEE 
2 IEEEAC paper#1057, Version 4, Updated 2009:10:27 
“To provide store-and-forward services, the Bundle Protocol 
(BP) sits at the application layer of some number of 
constituent internets, forming a store-and-forward overlay 
network.  Key capabilities of the BP include: 
• Custody-based retransmission, a willingness to take 
responsibility for forwarding a received bundle, thereby 
allowing the transmitting system to release storage 
buffer space. 
• Ability to cope with intermittent connectivity. 
• Ability to take advantage of scheduled, predicted, and 
opportunistic connectivity (in addition to continuous 
connectivity) 
• Late binding of overlay network endpoint identifiers to 
constituent subnetwork addresses, thereby enabling a 
bundle to move closer to its endpoint without complete 
knowledge of the endpoint physical address until 
perhaps even the last hop.” [4] 
 
Successful end-to-end transmission of bundles depends on 
the operation of underlying protocols, known as 
“convergence layers".  These convergence layers may have 
extremely different characteristics (e.g. addressing, security, 
routing) and may even be associated with completely 
different network types. Furthermore, the convergence layer 
is a functional network stack in its own right that includes a 
transport protocol and a network protocol.  For example, 
bundle communication may utilize a TCP or UDP 
convergence layer to ride on top of an Internet Protocol 
network.  Or, it may utilize LTP over CCSDS packets or 
LTP over UDP over IP or run directly on top of a Bluetooth 
network or even directly to a removable storage device.    
Each convergence layer protocol adapter is expected to, at a 
minimum, be able to send a bundle to all bundle nodes and 
to deliver to the local bundle protocol agent a received 
bundle, that was sent by a remote bundle node via the 
convergence layer protocol. 
2. NETWORK SECURITY  
Traditionally, a space system has been designed more or 
less as a direct data link between Mission Operations and 
the in-space asset.  There are a number of reasons for this.  
The primary reason is that networking technology did not 
exist and most communication was via direct circuits and 
circuit switching; this was the way space communications 
had always been done.  Techniques and technologies such 
as the CCSDS Space Link Extensions for Transfer Services 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110016123 2019-08-30T17:39:27+00:00Z
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(SLE-TS) [5] have been developed to allow legacy systems 
to extend the space link over Internet Protocol networks 
using TCP/IP protocols.   
Traditional space-based point-to-point datalinks have been 
secured using bulk encryption.   This is a very simple way 
to secure a datalink, but is extremely inflexible and is only 
good for a single datalink.  Bulk encryption is not meant for 
transition over a multi-hop system. When deploying bulk 
encryption of datalink over a network, special hardware and 
techniques are required to encapsulate the bulk encryption 
into packets that can transition the network.  Those 
encapsulating packets need to be time-stamped and 
sequenced in order for the encrypted circuit to be 
reconstructed at the other end of the network.   
Networking using packet-based (or bundle-based) 
techniques allows for communication over multiple hops.  
Each network packet (or bundle) can be encrypted (or 
simply digitally signed for authentication) and routed 
through a multi-hop system.  The Bundle Protocol 
recognizes layering by its use of convergence layer adapters. 
Network security is extremely flexible; but, with that 
flexibility, comes complexity.  The complexity depends on 
the granularity and fidelity of how one may wish to secure 
the network.    
Note, in some ways, it is much easier to secure a network, 
by considering at which layer security is required, and 
should be applied. 
Keys and Policy 
Both bulk encryption and network security require 
distribution of keys.  However, for a point-to-point datalink, 
those keys are limited.  In addition, for bulk encryption, 
only keys need be distributed and managed.  
For network security, not only do keys have to be 
distributed, but there is also security policy that 
accompanies those keys.  In addition, security is directional 
– that is one may be permitted to send to a source, but not to 
receive from the source, or vice versa.  Furthermore, the 
keys may have lifetimes associated with them, requiring 
refresh or replacement upon expiry.  These keys and 
policies must be managed and there must be a mechanism to 
distribute, refresh, and revoke the keys and policies.  
Furthermore, those keys and policies are only as secure as 
the mechanism used to distribute them. 
Key management is critical for network security.  Key and 
policy distribution is extremely difficult in a always 
connected network.  For a disconnected or ad-hoc network 
such as a DTN, this becomes even more difficult.  
Currently, no key management mechanisms have been 
identified for DTNs.  This is considered a major area of 
research. 
The following are some examples of a combination of keys 
and policy: 
(1) Internet protocols:  Machine A on network a may 
communicate with Machine B on network b using 
UDP protocol and Port 5349 with key XYZ where key 
XYZ is valid for the next month.  Machine B may not 
Communicate with Machine A.  Thus, unidirectional 
communication is defined here 
(2) Internet Protocols:  any machine on Network A may 
communicate with any machine on network B and vice 
versa, using any protocol and any port with Key ABC, 
where Key ABC is valid for 20 years. 
(3) Internet Protocols:  Machine A and Machine B may 
communicate using a session key.  They validate each 
other via certificates and then securely establish the 
session key using protocols such as IKEv2 (Internet 
Key Exchange version II).   Each of those certificates 
has a lifetime.  Each of those certificates has been 
signed by a trusted third party and can be verified – 
though the connectivity required for verification of the 
certificate may not be available, and verification may 
be cached and itself subject to expiry.  Generally, in 
order to utilize session keys, the communication links 
need some reasonable bandwidth and relatively low 
delay – less than a few seconds.  Otherwise, it is very 
difficult to negotiate session keys.  One should not 
expect to be able to negotiate in many or most DTNs.  
In fact, one may only have one-way-communications 
and DTN should still be usable. Thus session keys 
only make sense for DTN networks where it is 
possible to negotiate in a reasonable time relative to 
the type of communication taking place. 
(4) DTN:  Bundle Agent B authenticates bundle Agent A, 
the previous hop forwarding agent, using key DEF.  
Key DEF may have a lifetime.  Key DEF may have 
been sent to Agent B from Agent A encrypted using 
Bundle Agent A’s private Key where Bundle Agent B 
has Bundle Agent A’s public certificate.  Agent A’s 
key has been signed by a trusted third party and cached 
locally. (Note, in a DTN network, one should not 
expect to be able reach any type of system to validate 
certificates and keys in a timely manner).  This type of 
authentication may be useful for authenticating routing 
protocols communications in order to thwart denial of 
services attacks where a rogue bundle agent wishes to 
inject false routing information into the network. 
(5) DTN:  Bundle Agent D authenticates the source that 
generated a particular bundle.  The local DTN policy 
may state that Bundle Agent D only stores or forwards 
bundles from particular sources with pre-existing 
service agreements.  This may be done to limit the 
amount of resources used by various individuals or 
organizations.   
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• This is likely the most useful form of DTN 
security that will be deployed in space-based 
networks because allocation of resources 
(storage, transmission, battery life, etc) is critical 
for a space-based DTN node. 
(6) DTN:  Bundle is encrypted with Key PCB.  In 
addition, the bundle has 5 pieces of meta-data.  Each 
meta-data block has a different fidelity of information 
regarding the payload (e.g map, map of Middle East, 
map of Iraq, map of streets of Baghdad, map of street 
of Baghdad with ammunition stores). Each piece of 
meta-data is encrypted with a different key, Key 1 – 5. 
This type of encryption is envisioned for use by 
DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Program 
Agency) to perform a type of secure content-based 
storage and delivery, whereby the URI of a DTN 
packet may be more in the form of request for some 
type of content (e.g. 
dtn:exec:return:middle_east.ammunition_stores ) 
• Key and policy management in such a system is 
EXTREMELY difficult and may not be 
realizable on a large scale. 
• The applicability of this example for a space-
based network is questionable due to the large 
amount of keying material and the complex 
management of such material.  
Shared Keys (Group Keys) 
One may wish to utilize group keys and shared keys among 
a large group of users in order to reduce the complexity of 
management of keys.  However, if a key falls into the wrong 
hands or is compromised, notifying the group, revoking the 
shared key and rekeying is problematic in a disconnected 
network. 
Utilizing group keys across multiple agencies may not be 
acceptable as the larger and more diverse the group,  the 
harder it is to control the key.  This, of course,  is a “Rules 
of  Engagement” decision – “How does one want to 
operate?  How is one permitted to operate?” 
Cross Enterprise Security and International Interoperability 
Cross-organization security is a “Rules of Engagement” 
issue.  There are technologies and techniques in place to 
enable security, depending on what type of trust 
relationships the various organizations have.   
One technique is to have a trusted third party be the root 
signer of certificates in a chain of trust.  If one can validate 
back to the root authority, the certificates are accepted.   
For international interoperability with regard to a space 
network (consisting of both space and ground assets), 
technologies for generation and distribution of security 
keys/certificates and security policy for either Internet 
Protocols or DTNs is likely to fall under International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  This is a difficult,  
critical area that must be addressed  internationally.   
3. THREATS 
General Security Threats for Overlay Networks 
An overlay network inherits all of the good and all of the 
bad of the underlying networks upon which it resides.  For 
example, if an overlay network passes over three different 
concatenated underlying networks, then the overlay network 
is vulnerable to all of the insecurities of any of the 
underlying networks (e.g. denial of service, man-in-the-
middle, masquerading,).  This makes overlay networks 
much more difficult to secure as one has to secure each 
underlying network in addition to applying proper security 
to the network overlay itself.  On the other hand, if an 
overlay network resides on a very secure underlying 
network, one may be able to simply secure the overlay 
network by securing the underlying network.  For example, 
if one already has a closed, secure Internet Protocol (IP) 
network and is running an overlay network such as DTN on 
top, one may be willing to simply allow IP security to 
handle the overlay network’s security needs. 
Understanding Protocol Layers 
There are six basic areas from which security can be 
compromised in a DTN network:  Physical Access, Physical 
Link, Data-Link, the Network Layer, the DTN Overlay, and 
the Applications.   
For space-based networks, physical access is usually not an 
issue.  One has highly controlled physical security at 
Mission Operations centers and ground centers and one will 
know who is residing on any space-base platform.  Thus 
physical security is no different than for any other network. 
Physical Media is either the wire, fiber, or radio link that 
data travels over.  For space-based networks between the 
Mission Operations centers and the ground station one could 
do bulk encryptions over wire or fiber lines.  However, it is 
much easier to simply encrypt at the network layer if one 
has either designed the system as an IP-based network or if 
one is capable of tunneling the datalink over an IP network.  
The later can become quite expensive and complex – 
particularly for high-speed networks.    
Radio links may also be encrypted.  Radio links are subject 
to jamming and some type of anti-jam radio system many be 
required.  For space-based systems, if someone is jamming, 
they are likely in violation of international law.  It is 
probably fairly easy to identify a jammer as they require 
significant equipment and knowledge of your system in 
order to jam you. As far as deep space is concerned, few 
people own and operate thirty-meter dishes.  
The Data-Link layer is responsible for node-to-node (hop-
to-hop) frame delivery on the same link.  The Data-Link 
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layer contains the Media Access Control (MAC) and the 
Logical Link Control (LLC).  It ensures that an initial 
connection has been set up, divides output data into data 
frames, and handles the acknowledgements from a receiver 
that the data arrived successfully. It also ensures that 
incoming data has been received successfully by analyzing 
bit patterns at special places in the frames.  Some examples 
of data links include Ethernet, HDLC, and CCSDS Space 
Packet Protocol.   
For space-systems, the data-link is often secured using bulk 
encryption immediately before entering the radio and bulk 
decryption immediately after exiting the radio.  Special 
wrapping techniques exist where this encryption may occur 
at the mission operation center and the encrypted data sent 
over the network. 
The Network Layer is responsible for source to destination 
“packet” delivery. The network layer is where addressing 
occurs and where routing is performed.   For IP networks, 
the addressing occurs at the network layer and is 
hierarchical.  IP networks are secured using IP security 
protocols (IPsec).  IP security is tied to the interface address.  
Since IP security is address-based and the address can be 
hierarchical, IPsec can be hierarchical thereby enabling 
aggregation of addresses into sets to which security policies 
can be applied. 
The Transport Layer is responsible for delivering data 
between appropriate application processes on two or more 
separate end systems via the underlying network (or 
datalink if no network exists).  Some examples of transport 
protocols include the TransMission Operations Protocols 
(TCP) and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) in IP 
networks, and the Licklider Protocol for long-delay space 
links. The Licklider protocol is intended to interface directly 
to the data-link layer in space-based implementations.   
In IP networks, the transport layer is often secured using the 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol.  TLS provides 
security and data integrity across IP networks. It allows 
client/server applications to communicate across a network 
in a way designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and 
message forgery. TLS requires low-delay control loops and 
continuous or nearly continuous connectivity and therefore 
is of little utility in many, if not most, DTNs. 
The Licklider Transport Protocol (LTP) is intended to serve 
as a reliable convergence layer over single-hop deep-space 
radio frequency (RF) links. LTP does Automatic Repeat 
reQuest (ARQ) of data transmissions by soliciting selective-
acknowledgment reception reports.  It is stateful and has no 
initial negotiation or handshakes.  Hence, LTP is designed 
for use in and favored as the transport protocol of choice for 
deep space communications. There is a security 
specification for LTP [4] which defines security extensions 
for LTP generally intended to help thwart DoS attacks.   
However, such attacks in a space-based network are highly 
unlikely.   
In general, a DTN is any delay-tolerant network; however,  
this term has been appropriated to mean a store-and-forward 
network overlay using the Bundle Protocol. The overall 
DTN is responsible for source to destination “bundle” 
delivery.  Since data is at rest and can live for very long 
periods of time, this data is more vulnerable than data that 
simply passes through a system in the form of packets.  An 
end-to-end control loop for resends of data may be absent, 
due to the disconnected nature of the underlying network.   
A DTN as described in RFC 4838 [1] can be thought of as a 
network of application-layer gateways.  This type of DTN 
does not really have an addressing scheme per se.  Rather, it 
operates over Convergence Layers which are underlying 
protocols that accomplish communication between DTN 
entities using the Bundle Protocol (BP) communications.  A 
DTN resides above the transport layer, whereas an IP 
network generally resides below the transport layer.  A DTN 
can bridge between dissimilar lower-layer networks and can 
operate simultaneously over heterogeneous networks (i.e. 
CCSDS, IPv4, IPv6 and Bluetooth) or even directly over a 
datalink protocol.   DTNs can be attacked via any networks 
and links they reside on at any layer.   
DTNs as specified in RFC’s 4838 and 5050 are name-based.  
To date, DTN naming is an open issue and a difficult one. 
How names are to be used in routing, and how this will be 
mapped to the underlying routing of each convergence layer 
network, is unclear.  A naming system that allows for 
aggregation has the potential to greatly simplify both 
routing and security.  For security reasons and resource 
allocation, one would like to be able to uniquely identify a 
source as well as be able to determine which group or 
groups this source may belong to.  A properly constructed 
naming scheme will help considerably with this. 
The Application Layer contains all protocols and methods 
that fall into the realm of process-to-process 
communications.  The application layer sits on top of the 
DTN network layer and above the IP transport layer.  
4. PRACTICAL EXPLOITATIONS 
Past history has shown that four areas are generally most 
likely to be attacked:  the network, transport and application 
layers, and imperfections in the code.  
Network Layer Exploits 
One can attack a network to either attempt to redirect traffic 
or to create denial of services (DOS) or disrupt the network.  
The implications of this regarding military networks is 
obvious.  DOS attacks may also cause great economic 
impact on private enterprise, or nations.  Another exploit is 
to simply be able to enter a closed network and cause 
problems elsewhere. 
The DTN Bundle Security Specification defines a Bundle 
Authentication Block (BAB), a Payload Integrity Block 
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(PIB), and a Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB) to help 
thwart network layer exploits. 
Transport Layer Exploits 
The transport layer has been exploited in the Internet to 
create denial of services or connection hijacking.  Example 
include: TCP SYN-flood attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks 
and UDP flooding.   
The Licklider Transport Protocol defines security 
extensions for LTP generally intended to help thwart DoS 
attacks.  These include options for implementing cookies 
and /or cryptographic authentication of a segment. 
Application Layer Exploits 
The Application Layer appears to be the layer of choice to 
exploit a system – at least within the internet – as evidenced 
by the vast amount of anti-virus and anti-spyware software.  
Most likely this is because it provides the biggest monetary 
payoff (e.g. identity theft, information theft).  Furthermore, 
it may be the easiest area to attack due to the vast number of 
applications and ease in exploiting human behavior.  One 
should anticipate similar exploits in DTNs. 
Code Implementation Exploits 
History has shown that it is often possible to exploit code 
implementations.  The nature of the bundle protocol adds 
additional potential vulnerabilities that should be addressed. 
Due to many variable-length fields, text-field parsing, and 
other bundle-processing operations, there may be risk due to 
implementation bugs (e.g. buffer overflows) that don't exist 
with fixed-width fields and binary formats (e.g. IP). There 
may be possibly attacks on host, CPU and memory by 
sending maliciously-crafted bundles and administrative 
records. 
Implementations need to carefully consider the resources 
they expose and the algorithms for managing them, 
including local storage, link access, and memory for 
management of contacts, in-memory bundle-metadata, 
timers, etc.  Internet experience shows that it's often 
possible to exploit implementation decisions about these 
things if the protocol doesn't protect them (witness TCP 
SYN-flood attacks which Internet community learned from 
and corrected in SCTP by deploying a 4-way handshake 
instead of a 3-way). 
5. SECURITY ASSESSMENT FOR SPACE-BASED 
DTNS  
Closed versus Open Networks 
In general, space networks are closed networks.  Closed 
networks, in theory, eliminate many of the exploits above 
from ever getting an opportunity to entering the system.  
However, once one starts interconnecting networks as 
would be the case for international interoperability, then one 
enters a gray area somewhere between closed and open. 
Architectures and Security 
It is generally agreed upon by security experts that the 
simpler the network architecture the better.  The notion is 
that one can better understand the flow of data and the 
potential places the network can be exploited.  One can then 
put security mechanisms in place to shore up any weakness. 
Internet or 
Intranet
DTN 
Bundle 
Agent
Application DTN Bundle Agent Datalink Encryptor
Space Link Extension –
Transfer Layer Application
 
Figure 1 - DTN over Encrypted Datalink using SLE-Transfer Services 
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Three simple architectures are shown in figures 1, 2 and 3.  
An analysis of the pros and cons of each is provided.  Two 
have a DTN bundle agent at Mission Operations and the 
next hop bundle agent on the spacecraft.  The third has a 
DTN bundle agent at each ground station.  For these 
architectures, we assume that one would be operating via an 
international internetworked system as this is the most 
general case.  Thus, assume that the Mission Operations 
center is sending data through a third-party ground station.  
In such a case, it would be unlikely that one would be 
encrypting the uplink at the ground station.  Therefore case 
1 and 2 have the datalink encrypted at the Mission 
Operations center and decrypted at the spacecraft.  These 
scenarios also assume that one has to, at a minimum, 
encrypt the uplink at the datalink layer or network layer – 
here, the DTN layer.  For these scenarios we assume 
Internet Protocols stop at the ground and CCSDS protocols 
are used for the space/ground communication link.  One 
could run DTN over an IP network and use IPsec or a 
combination of IPsec and DTN security to secure the system  
Figure 1 illustrates a scenario where a DTN node is at 
Mission Operations and the next hop DTN node is on the 
spacecraft.  We assume that encryption is required and that a 
third party ground station is used.  Thus, the datalink must 
be encrypted/decrypted between Mission Operations and the 
spacecraft.  In order to synchronize bit-stream data, special 
datalink encryptor/decryptor is required at Mission 
Operations.3  The encrypted data passes through the Space 
 
3 For extremely high-rate downlink data, an additional bitstream 
multiplexer (not shown in figure 1) may be required at each receiving 
ground station to multiplex and time-stamp the encrypted downlink 
bitstream prior to sending back to Mission Operations.  This can become 
quite expensive as such equipment has to be duplicated at each receiving 
ground station.  In addition, it makes international interoperability 
problematic due to concerns of sharing cryptographic related technology.   
Link Extension – Transfer Services Application and an 
application-layer tunnel and control loop are established.  
The data is forwarded from Mission Operations to the 
appropriate ground station via a secure IPsec tunnel 
established between the Mission Operations and ground 
station firewalls.  At the ground station, the datalink data is 
extracted from the SLE-TS tunnel and forwarded to the 
spacecraft.  At the spacecraft, the DTN bundles can be 
extracted and forwarded on to the next appropriate bundle 
agent (here, the moon).  
Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1 in that it illustrates a scenario 
where a DTN node is at Mission Operations and the next 
hop DTN node is on the spacecraft.  However, here DTN 
bundle security replaces the secure datalink (albeit both can 
be utilized). Again, we assume that encryption is required 
and that a third party ground station is used.  Here, the 
“bundles” are secured between Mission Operations and the 
appropriate endpoint – be it the spacecraft of the lunar node.  
The encrypted bundles pass through the Space Link 
Extension – Transfer Services Application and an 
application-layer tunnel and control loop are established.  
The data is forwarded from Mission Operations to the 
appropriate ground station via a secure IPsec tunnel which 
has been established between the Mission Operations and 
ground station firewalls.  At the ground station, the datalink 
data is extracted from the SLE-TS tunnel and forwarded to 
the spacecraft.  At the spacecraft, the DTN bundles can be 
extracted from the datalink stream and forwarded on to the 
next appropriate bundle agent. 
Internet or 
Intranet
DTN 
Bundle 
Agent
Application
Space Link Extension –
Transfer Layer Application
DTN Bundle Agent
Implementing 
Security
 
Figure 2 - Secure DTN using SLE-Transfer Services 
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In figure 3 a DTN bundle agent is placed at each ground 
station.  Since communication is hop-by-hop, there is no 
need to extend the space-link. Thus, the SLE-Transport 
Service Application gateways can be removed.  
Furthermore, the links can be optimized between each 
bundle node via the proper choice of convergence layers.   
For example, instead of running LTP between the lunar 
relay satellite and Mission Operations and one might have to 
do for scenarios 1 and 2, one can run TCP convergence 
layer between Mission Operations and the ground station 
and LTP between the ground station and the relay, thereby 
optimizing  the transport protocol for each DTN link. 
Two important items to note from the three scenarios:   
(1) The complexity of the architecture goes down 
dramatically if one is willing to allow DTN to handle 
the security.  Simplifying architecture allows one to 
better understand and address weaknesses in the 
network and results in less areas that can be exploited 
and a more secure system. 
(2) The number of control loops is dramatically reduced.  
Each security mechanism has to be able to function 
within the characteristics of the underlying transport 
protocol and tunneling mechanism and each transport 
protocol has to be able to handle the idiosyncrasies of 
the embedded control loops.  The interactions between 
transport protocols and security mechanism can be 
quite subtle.  Thus, reducing the number of 
encapsulations is highly beneficial. 
6. CONTACT GRAPH ROUTING AND SECURITY  
Contact graph routing (CGR) is a method for routing that 
applies to scheduled networks such as a space backbone.  
CGR is currently the routing method of choice for the space 
backbone.  For space-based networks, CGR requires contact 
start/stop times and data rates, together with the distances 
[in light seconds] between the nodes.  For the 
communication paths to physically exist, the antenna 
systems must be pointed accordingly and all modulation and 
coding must also match on both ends of the communication 
link.   If CGR is to be used between systems owned and 
operated by different organizations (e.g. NASA, ESA and 
JAXA) then the contact information, orbital information, 
modulation and coding must be shared.  Thus, a reasonably 
strong trust relationship is required between organizations – 
almost to the point where the network looks like a closed 
network, open only to trusted parties. 
Currently, a specific routing protocol has not been 
developed to distribute the information that is required to 
configure contact graph routing.  Furthermore, this 
information is likely to be sourced from a central location 
such as a Mission Operations or network control center, not 
from the next neighbor.  Such information is likely to be 
delivered over the network management system.   
The bundle security protocol (BSP), Bundle Authentication 
Block (BAB) is used to thwart DOS and to ensure routing 
information exchange between “neighboring” DTN nodes is 
authenticated.  However, with the pre-established trust 
relationship required for CGR, there appears to be little need 
to implement the BAB in a space-backbone running CGR as 
it adds overhead and processing while providing little or no 
additional protection. 
Internet or 
Intranet
DTN 
Bundle 
Agent
Application
DTN Bundle Agent
Implementing 
Security  
 
Figure 3 – Secure DTN without the need for SLE-Transfer Services 
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On the other hand, routing information for CGR will likely 
be sourced from a DTN node many hops away.  In order to 
validate such information, one could utilize the Payload 
Integrity Block (PIB) or application-layer security.  
Furthermore, if one wishes to hide routing information 
residing in the payload, one could utilize the Payload 
Confidentiality Block (PCB). 
7. NETWORK MANAGEMENT 
Network Management consists of configuring bundle agents 
and monitoring network performance in order to both 
optimize performance and determine when something has 
failed either entirely or partially.   
Network management can be performed out-of-channel for 
some DTNs.  However, out-of-channel network 
management requires a direct link to the bundle agent and is 
therefore limiting.  For multi-hop DTNs where some bundle 
agents are only reachable via DTN technology, DTN 
protocols will be required to perform network management.   
Configurations may include the following:  distribution of 
contact graph routing information, configuration of radios 
(e.g. modulation, coding, data rates), security policy, 
security keys, and reporting.  If the network management 
system were compromised, it could lead to serious 
performance issues relative to the entire DTN network – 
even if only a single critical node where compromised. 
8. IRTF DTN SECURITY PROTOCOLS  
The following section addresses security issues related to 
specific RFC and internet drafts.     
As of November 2009, there are currently two documents 
specifically related to DTN security (e.g. the DTN Security 
Overview and the Bundle Security Protocol) and one 
additional document that utilizes the Bundle Security 
Protocol (Reliability-only Ciphersuites for the Bundle 
Protocol). There is one additional document specifying 
Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation that will likely be used in 
conjunction with the Bundle Security protocol to perform 
secure tunneling – the equivalent of “tunnel mode” in IP 
security.  RFC 5050 and the DTN URI Scheme have some 
security related issues although they do not specify security 
protocols. 
Bundling Protocol RFC 5050 
The Bundle Protocol, RFC 5050, requires that all 
communicating bundle nodes share a common, 
simultaneous, synchronized, conception of Universal Time 
Coordinated (UTC).  When a bundle is generated, an 
“absolute” creation time is included in the header.  This 
creation time is user as a time to live counter to keep bundle 
from continuously looping in a network and to allow bundle 
to expire and be removed from the network.  In addition, 
this timestamp is used to uniquely identify the bundle. 
For network-centric operations involving diverse 
organizations, it may not be possible from a security 
standpoint to accept time reference data from nodes 
operated by a different organization, even though data 
communications with that organization are deemed 
acceptable [7]. 
Because this timestamp is absolute time, it may be possible 
to cause inadvertent or intentional problems in the network 
by sending improper timestamps such as to make bundles 
look like they came from the future. Of course, if your 
system is not properly synchronized you may be living in 
the past and the bundles are actually OK.  This is likely a 
network policy configuration option to determine what to do 
with such a bundle. 
One can also send legitimate, extremely long-lived bundles 
that may not have a legitimate destination.  This could 
quickly consume system resources (storage).  What one 
does with such bundles is a local or organizational policy 
issue.  Implementations should be able to react to such 
policy. 
The DTN Universal Resource Identifier Scheme 
The DTN Universal Resource Identifier (URI) Scheme, 
draft-irtf-dtnrg-dtn-uri-scheme-xx, represents early thinking 
on this naming syntax. The scheme described is very likely 
to change in many respects as additional input is received 
from the Internet community.     In general, the proposed 
scheme-specific part (SSP) of a "dtn" URI is comprised of 
one or more dtn URI elements, each of which comprises an 
optional operation name followed by a URI.  The 
operational name enables flexibility to the point of perhaps 
actually specifying code to be run.  The proposed opnames 
identified in this document (e.g. next, push, pop, flood, 
exec) are purely notional at this point. 
“DTN URIs whose URI elements lack operation names or 
are confined to operation names "push" and "next" raise no 
security considerations beyond those addressed in RFC 
5050. 
The "pop" operation could be used to circumvent firewall 
rules that accept Bundle Protocol traffic but reject traffic 
destined for endpoints of the popped Internet application 
protocol. 
 Attacks built on the "flood" operation could exploit the 
possible side effects of evaluating selection expressions. 
 Attacks built on the "exec" operation could modify bundle 
node state in a limitless variety of ways. 
 Bundle protocol implementations that support these more 
dangerous operations will need to exercise extreme care 
[7].”  
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Delay-Tolerant Networking Security Overview 
The “Delay-Tolerant Networking Security Overview”, 
draft-irtf-dtnrg-sec-overview-xx, provides an overview of 
the security requirements and mechanisms considered for 
delay tolerant networking security for general DTNs.  It 
discusses the options for protecting such networks and 
describes reasons why specific security mechanisms were 
(or were not) chosen for the relevant protocols.  The entire 
document is informative, given its purpose is mainly to 
document design decisions.  Many of the threats identified 
in the DTN Security Overview document can be mitigated 
in space-based backbones.  Most have been address in the 
preceding  “Threats” section, section 3. 
One of the most critical threats for space-base DTNs is 
unauthorized use of resources – particularly storage and 
battery power. 
This document includes a good explanation of policy-based 
routing.  “It is a requirement that DTN protocols and 
implementations support mechanisms for policy-based 
routing.  In other words each DTN protocol specpolification 
should state the security-relevant policy variables upon 
which routing and forwarding decisions can be made.  . . .  
In particular, since forwarding even a single bundle will 
consume some network resources, every DTN node must 
implicitly incorporate some element of policy-based routing 
[8].” 
Bundle Security Protocol Specification 
The “Bundle Security Protocol Specification”, draft-irtf-
dtnrg-bundle-security-xx, defines the bundle security 
protocol, which provides data integrity and confidentiality 
services.  Note, this is a very complex document and has 
gone through a number of revisions.  The latest have been 
related to adding multi-layer security to meta-data blocks 
[9].  
There are four basic security blocks: the bundle 
authentication block (BAB), the Payload Integrity Block 
(PIB), the Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB) and the 
Extensions Security Block (ESB).   
Bundle Authentication Block 
The bundle authentication block (BAB) is used to assure the 
authenticity and integrity of the bundle along a single hop 
from forwarder to intermediate receiver. The BAB protects 
a bundle on a "hop-by-hop" basis while other security 
blocks may provide protection over several hops or end-to-
end.  Thus, whenever both are present the BAB must form 
the "outer" layer of protection.   
Currently (as of November 2009) only a share-key Hash 
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is defined for the 
BAB, HMAC-SHA1.  This ciphersuite could be used for 
group keying.  The key is not required to be one-to-one 
unique, just shared between the nodes that need it. If it is 
one-to-one unique then it can serve as additional validation 
of the node, but that's not required for bundle authentication.  
Note, there is no requirement to do bundle authentication 
using HMAC. One could create a new ciphersuite and 
define it to use a different keying scheme. For example, one 
could use an ephemeral key for HMACing and then encrypt 
that with the public key of the intended recipient. Only the 
recipient can decrypt the key and then verify the bundle.  
One could also establish short-term shared keys for HMAC-
SHA1 similar to a session key in IPsec.  However, exactly 
how to do that is not addressed in any current specification – 
that is, key management and distribution is yet to be 
defined. 
Payload Integrity Block 
“The Payload Integrity Block (PIB) is used to assure the 
authenticity and integrity of the payload from the PIB 
security-source, which creates the PIB, to the PIB security-
destination, which verifies the PIB     authenticator.  The 
authentication information in the PIB may (if the ciphersuite 
allows) be verified by any node in between the PIB security-
source and the PIB security-destination that has access to 
the cryptographic keys and revocation status information 
required to do so.” 
The PIB may be of greatest use in space-based networks as 
operationally one may not care what the previous hop 
source’s unique identity is (that is probably known or 
implied via scheduling information).  Rather, one needs to 
know if the bundle originates from a trusted community as 
this is likely to be the filter for policy-based routing.  Policy 
may state that one is willing to store and forward bundles 
from various communities, but not from others.   
For contact graph routing, where distribution of contract 
graph information originates from a central source, the 
Payload Integrity Block (and perhaps the payload 
confidentiality block) are the proper security mechanisms to 
use if security is to be performed at the bundle layer.   
Payload Confidentiality Block 
“The Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB) indicates that the 
payload has been encrypted, in whole or  in part, at the PCB 
security-source in order to protect the bundle content while 
in transit to the PCB security-destination. 
It is STRONGLY RECOMMENDED that a data integrity 
mechanism be used in conjunction with confidentiality, and 
that encryption-only ciphersuites NOT be used.” 
Extensions Security Block 
“The Extension security block (ESB) provides protection for 
non-payload-related portions of a bundle.  They MUST 
NOT be used for the primary block or payload, including 
payload-related security blocks (PIBs and PCBs).  .  .  . 
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The ESB is placed in the bundle in the same position as the 
block being protected.  That is, the entire original block is 
processed (encrypted etc) and encapsulated in a "replacing" 
ESB-type block, and this appears in the bundle at the same 
sequential position as the original block.  The processed 
data is placed in the security-result field.” 
The ESB is likely to be used to protect Meta-data blocks.  
Meta-data blocks are described in the internet draft entitle 
“Delay-Tolerant Networking Metadata Extension Block.” 
[10] The Metadata Extension Block is designed to be used 
to carry application-level information that DTN nodes can 
use to make DTN-level processing decisions regarding 
bundles, such as deciding whether to store a bundle or 
determining to which nodes to forward a bundle. 
General Notes Concerning the Bundle Security Protocols—
PIB and PCB protect the payload and are regarded as 
"payload-related".   Other blocks are regarded as "non-
payload" blocks.   
The ESB provides security for non-payload blocks in a 
bundle.  ESB therefore is not applied to PIB or PCBs, and of 
course is not appropriate for either the payload block or 
primary block. 
Bundles protected using PCB must be processed in order.  
Great care must be taken to ensure that security zones do not 
overlap.  One may have nested security zones (DTN 
tunneling), but one may not have overlapping security 
zones.  A detailed discussion on security zones is provided 
in the bundle security specification [9]. 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) has a significant research effort in DTN directed 
toward military applications.  Much of the complexities of 
the security protocol appear to be related to the potential to 
utilize DTN bundling as a method to perform secure content 
storage and delivery which is applicable to content-base 
routing or content-based distribution.  Items continue to be 
developed and added to the bundle specification such as 
meta-data blocks and the corresponding Extension Security 
Block.  Indications are that these items can be combined to 
enable a type of multi-layer security for content storage, 
discovery and distribution. 
Implementing security with fragmentation is quite complex. 
Implementing reactive fragmentation is often not possible 
depending on the security policies and ciphersuites used.  
Thus, it is highly recommended that one avoid 
fragmentation if at all possible.   A detailed discussion is 
provided in the bundle security specification [9]. 
DTN Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation 
The Delay-Tolerant Networking Bundle-in-Bundle 
Encapsulation draft, draft-irtf-dtnrg-bundle-encapsulation-
xx, defines an encapsulation-specific application agent 
capability and a bundle payload format for use with the 
Bundle Protocol.  It defines the capability and format for 
placing one or more bundles inside of the payload field of 
an encapsulating bundle's Bundle Payload Block [11]. 
Bundle-in-Bundle encapsulation can be used for security 
purposes.   One or more bundles can be placed inside of the 
payload of another bundle and then the payload of the 
encapsulating bundle can be encrypted.  The encapsulating 
bundle is then sent from the encapsulating security gateway 
to the de-encapsulating security gateway forming a security 
tunnel.  This security tunnel protects the entire contents of 
the encapsulated bundle(s) from being disclosed, so that 
even the confidentiality of each bundle’s source EID and 
destination EID are maintained on the portion of the 
network that is spanned by the tunnel.  One may anticipate 
that this technique will be applied in a similar manner to 
IPsec tunnel-mode to effectively hide traffic from one DTN 
network inside another. 
Reliability-only Ciphersuites for the Bundle Protocol 
The Reliability-only Ciphersuites for the Bundle Protocol, 
draft-irtf-dtnrg-bundle-checksum-05, defines new 
ciphersuites for use within the existing Bundle Security 
Protocol's Payload Integrity Block to provide error-detection 
functions.  The reliability ciphersuites do not require support 
for other, more complex, security-providing ciphersuites 
that protect integrity against deliberate modifications.  This 
creates the checksum service needed for error-free 
reliability, and does so by separating security concerns from 
the few new reliability-only ciphersuite definitions.  The 
reliability-only ciphersuites are intended to protect only 
against errors and accidental modification; not against 
deliberate integrity violations. 
“The Delay-Tolerant Networking Bundle Protocol includes 
a custody transfer mechanism to provide acknowledgements 
of receipt for particular bundles.  However, no checksum is 
included in the basic DTN Bundle Protocol. Therefore, at 
intermediate hops, it is not possible to verify that bundles 
have been either forwarded or passed through convergence 
layers without error.  Without assurance that a bundle has 
been received without errors, the custody transfer receipt 
cannot guarantee that a correct copy of the bundle has been 
transferred, and errored bundles are forwarded when the 
destination cannot use the errored content, and discarding 
the errored bundle early would have been better for 
performance and throughput reasons.  The reliability-only 
ciphersuites provide the checksum function required to 
alleviate this problem [12].”  
There are two negatives regarding using the BSP to 
implement checksums.  The first is that the complex bundle 
security protocol must be implemented by all nodes wishing 
to perform reliability checks.  This may be a rather extreme 
processing requirement for a low-end DTN node such as 
simple sensor webs.  The second is purely a human factors 
issue.  One may be implementing reliability and believe that 
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they are also secure because they are implementing a 
portion of the security specification. 
9. OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS 
There are four basic security tools currently developed for 
DTN bundle security, all are defined in the Bundle Security 
Protocol document.   These are: authentication of neighbors 
(BAB), integrity (PIB), confidentiality of the payload (PCB) 
and confidentiality of other bundles such as meta-data 
(ESB). 
 
For space-based DTNs which are highly scheduled such that 
contact times, modulation, coding, media access, antenna 
pointing , etcetera are know, the usefulness of the BAB is 
questionable as there is already a strong trust relationship in 
order to establish communication at the physical layer.  The 
added complexity, added key distribution and management 
and potential for lockout versus the risk of not 
authenticating you neighbor must be considered.  
Furthermore, if one is operating across organizational 
domains, a shared key (HMAC) is probably not acceptable.  
Rather, asymmetric keys based on certificates are likely to 
be acceptable as this is easier to control and validate across 
organizational boundaries.   
 
One will likely have security policies in place that control 
and limit the use of system resources.  This policy should 
require one to identify the source of data and determine 
what organization that source belongs to.  The PIB would 
likely be used here.  If the keys are certificate-based, one 
could validate the certificate against an organizational 
certificate that has been cross certified thereby identifying 
the source as belonging to a particular organization.  For 
DTNs this requires cross-organizational certification of 
signing certificates and sharing of public certificates.  
Certificates would also have to be cached locally as one 
must assume that the DTN Bundle Agent cannot reach a 
certificate server and revocation list in a timely manner 
except for DTN where the ‘D’ implies short term disruption, 
a very specific case of DTN.   
 
Common practice today is that the network is run by one 
group and the applications are run by another.   For 
example, in NASA Mission Operations does not run the 
ground infrastructure or radio and ground stations.  That is 
the responsibility of the Space Communication and 
Navigation (SCaN) Program, the IP Operation Network 
(IONET) group, the Space Network group and the Deep 
Space Network group.  Mission Operations is responsible 
for the spacecraft control and the applications.  The 
management of security of the mission systems and the 
communication infrastructure is currently separate and 
likely to continue – particularly if one considers tying 
communication networks together with international 
partners.  Thus, one should anticipate the key and policy 
management of applications will be performed and 
controlled by a different group than that which controls key 
and policy for the communication network.    
 
An example of Mission Operations managing application 
security can be seen in the NASA Constellation program.  
Here, the Constellation Communication Framework 
structure has a security element very similar to bundling to 
enable authentication, integrity and confidentiality.    Here, 
authentication may be used to authenticate commands and 
confidentiality may be utilized to encrypt crew medical data.  
This application layer security most certainly is managed by 
Mission Operations, not by network security.   
 
From the above observations, for space-based networks or 
any DTN network, encrypting bundles is probably only 
useful for bundles related to networking and not bundle 
related to application.  The application data should be 
protected by those responsible for the applications.  Such an 
approach should make security management easier.  
Applications are protected end-to-end whereas the network 
is protected at all points of the communication chain using a 
variety of tools.  This may be contrary to what DARPA is 
considering where they mix Bundle Security, a network 
layer, with secure content storage, distribution and delivery, 
an application.   
 
One area that needs special consideration regarding 
encryptions is DTN network management.  Who will 
control this security layer is not clear.  Network 
Management is an application, but it is also likely to be 
managed by the communication network group.  Thus, it 
may be appropriate to allow bundle security to be used to 
protect the network management application data.   
 
The need to protect metadata versus the complexity of key 
and policy management is and open issue for space-based 
networks as is how one might use meta-data blocks for 
space-based applications. 
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